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It is an open secret that Middle Eastern proven oil reserves are not sufficient to 
meet the increasing hydrocarbon needs of European and American economies. 
Finding new supply channels is of the utmost importance. Many countries have 
therefore begun to focus on the Caspian basin energy resources. However, 
extraction and export of these precious resources via the South Caucasus or South 
Asia would flout the regional energy monopoly of the Russian giant Gazprom, 
whose “Druzhba” pipeline, the most important of its network, crosses Ukraine to 
supply European markets. 
 
In an attempt to counter Russia‟s “leverage” in the energy market of the former 
Soviet Union the United States, together with various European countries, has 
sponsored a number of important projects. The Nabucco pipeline, scheduled to be 
operational in 2018, will carry gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and possibly 
Kazakhstan to Europe, bypassing Russia to the south. Between 2002 and 2004 the 
Kremlin hindered the development of this project with the help of the Ukrainian 
government of pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma. However, following the November 
2004 Orange Revolution and the election of liberal opposition leader Viktor 
Yushchenko as President, Ukraine changed course and endeavored to join 
Western-oriented political structures. It even expressed a clear wish to become a 
member of the North Atlantic alliance (NATO). This move evoked hard-line 
Russian criticism, especially from the ruling elite.  
 
The election of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2010, which was followed by a 
dispute over the transparency of his the election instigated by his main rival, Yulia 
Timoshenko, in custody since August 2011 for having exceeded her authority in 
signing a gas agreement with Russia in 2009 while she was Prime minister, could 
again reverse Ukraine‟s position and, thereby, force a reconfiguration of the 
strategy of the various players involved in the frantic competition for Central 
Asia‟s energy resources, a contemporary competition similar to the infamous 
“Great Game” of the 19th Century. 
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This article takes a look at the main protagonists‟ strategies and interests in the 
battle for the control of the extraction, transport, refining and consumption of 
Central Asian “black gold.” 
 
 
Historical Context of the “New Great Game”  
 
The geopolitical significance of Central and South Asia has long been 
acknowledged. This vast region is considered to be the heart of the “World-Island,” 
the vast landmass including Europe, Asia and Africa. Halford John Mackinder, one 
of the fathers of modern geopolitics, wrote in 1904: “Who rules East Europe 
commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; 
who rules the World-Island controls the world.” In these three simple sentences 
this classical scholar of geopolitics conveys the gist of his Heartland theory, which 
was destined to gain great currency in later decades, though subject to different 
interpretations.
1
 Mackinder‟s theory, according to many observers of the time, was 
to some extent validated by the so-called “Great Game,” the long and debilitating 
struggle for power and influence in the nineteenth century between the Tsar and 
Her Majesty. Indeed, both the Russian and British Empires made continuing efforts 
to impose and maintain their dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus.  
 
Mackinder also referred to that same region as the “Heartland.” This designation 
was first coined during the second half of the 1800s to describe the Central Asia 
and Caucasus territories then under Russian control.  Inaccessible by sea, rich in oil 
and natural gas, these territories were the pivotal point of Tsarist Russia‟s strategy 
in the international arena. The imbalance of power imposed by the Congress of 
Vienna (1814-15), which divided up Europe after Napoleon‟s defeat, gave the 
Russian Tsar the opportunity to conquer the outlying territories of Eurasia and later 
exploit the vast energy resources they contained. The wealth thus derived gave St. 
Petersburg sufficient resources to construct a fleet strong enough, to compete with 
the British Empire‟s for control of the oceans.  
 
The Mediterranean and Indian Oceans were priorities of the nineteenth century 
Tsarist administrations. However, their interest in these oceans waned after the 
Russian defeat in the Crimean War
2
 (1853-1856), which changed the course of 
Tsarist foreign policy. After being overwhelmed by the Turks, who were supported 
by French and British troops, on the Crimean Peninsula, Russia aimed to expand its 
sphere of influence in Central Asia with a view to proceed south and secure an 
outlet to the Indian Ocean. 
 
St. Petersburg‟s expansionist foreign policy quickly met tough opposition in 
Britain. India, under British control, and considered by Queen Victoria the jewel in 
the crown of the British Empire, was threatened by the continuous progress of 
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Tsarist troops through Central Asia. This threat had to be eliminated. Accordingly, 
the British tried to assert their own superiority in Central Asia, threatening war 
over Afghanistan in both 1885 and 1904.The Afghan territory was turned into a 
buffer zone to protect the British colonies from the hegemonic pretensions of St. 
Petersburg. These events set off a long-lasting conflict in the second half of the 
19th century whose results continue to impact world politics today. 
  
 
The Strategic Importance of Central Asia Today  
 
Today this contested region again carries great influence on the geopolitical 
strategies of the dominant states. Geologists and industry experts confirm that the 
area contains a vast underground supply of hydrocarbons.
3
 These energy resources 
are not quantitatively comparable to those of the Persian Gulf, but are ample 
enough to satisfy, at least for a significant period of time, the gluttonous energy 
appetite of the major powers and could serve as an excellent substitute for Middle 
Eastern oil, whose supply is subject to continuous fluctuations due to the threat of 
Islamic fundamentalism, international terrorism and, since January 2011, 
“spontaneous” social revolutions. The richest deposits so far discovered are in the 
Caspian Basin, which is surrounded by Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Iran. Crude oil extraction in Azerbaijan increased from 180,000 barrel 
per day (bbl/d) in 1997 to 1.07 million bbl/d in 2010, according to OPEC.
4
 This 
South Caucasus country is also blessed with the largest known reserves of natural 
gas, production of which reached 583 Billion cubic feet (Bcf) in 2010. 
Turkmenistan, another major regional gas supplier, produced 189,400 bbl/d of 
crude oil and 70.5 Bcf of natural gas in 2008. Uzbekistan also commands 
considerable hydrocarbon reserves, which in 2009 amounted to 59.4 Bcf of gas and 
60,820 bbl/d of oil.
5
 The Kazakh Caspian coast holds an impressive quantity of oil, 
production of which was running at 1.45 million bbl/d in 2007. Finally, in 2008 
Iran exported 2.4 million barrels of oil per day to Asia and European countries 
belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD).
6
 
 
The role of Central Asia and the Caspian basin as a commercial hub should also 
not be underestimated. Since ancient times these regions have been a crossroads of 
land, sea and river routes. Centuries ago, the latter connected China with the 
Mediterranean and were the path taken by the caravans of camels loaded with 
precious and exotic oriental goods designated for Western markets. This 
commercial corridor was called by the German geographer and geologist Ferdinand 
von Richthofen the “Seidenstrabe” (Silk Road). 
 
Tsarist, Soviet and modern Russian rulers have always considered Central Asia a 
strategic region. During World War II, and later during the Cold War between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, this territory acted as a strategic rear reservoir 
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of energy for the powerful Soviet war machine. However, according to Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, who worked as an adviser to former U.S. president Jimmy Carter 
(1976-1980), the collapse of the USSR in 1991 left a partial power vacuum in that 
region. The rapid erosion of Moscow‟s control was accelerated by a few key 
factors: Ukraine‟s declaration of  independence in 1991; Turkey‟s continued 
attempts to increase its influence in nearby Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia; the 
revival of nationalist fervor in all corners of the Soviet federation; Central Asian 
republics‟ attempts to reduce their economic dependence on the Soviet Union and 
post-Soviet Russia, although the developmental models adopted by these newly 
independent states still had a distinctly Soviet flavor. 
 
Consequently, the early nineties brought to the forefront the need to diversify 
Central Asian countries‟ political and economic partners. However, the 
implementation of classical liberal policies designed to foster greater economic 
cooperation between Central Asian countries and, subsequently, regional political 
integration has proved extremely difficult because various practical obstacles have 
emerged. For instance, Kyrgyzstan, a poor and politically unstable country, was 
able to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) back in 1998, while Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Afghanistan and Iran have so far only achieved observer 
status. 
 
It quickly became only too apparent to the leadership of these countries that their 
weak economies were poorly diversified and, therefore, could not withstand the 
flood of goods imported from more powerful neighbors, particularly China, a 
country with various comparative and competitive advantages, including its 
geographical location. It also soon became necessary to adopt protectionist policies 
to safeguard national economies and focus primarily on putting social institutions 
on a sound footing. More foreign direct investment was also needed to lay down 
the transport infrastructure required for the enhancement of profitable trade in 
Eurasia and for greater economic and financial integration among the fragile 
Central Asian countries. Consequently, a no holds barred diplomatic struggle for 
influence between the great powers came into being, with each seeking a slice of 
the geopolitical cake in Central and South Asia. 
 
Joseph Nye, a scholar at Harvard,
7
 believes that economic, political, social and 
religious global forces have catapulted nation-states into an increasingly 
interdependent world. The establishment of diversified and profitable trade 
relations and new routes for the export of large volumes of hydrocarbons are 
unavoidable if Central Asian states really want to ensure their financial, 
commercial, political and military development. This has opened the way for 
China, the United States and the European Union to participate in interesting 
commercial and energy deals in a region that was formerly, for over fifty years, the 
exclusive domain of Moscow.  
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A new “Great Game” broke out in Central and South Asia in the 1990s and is still 
being played out in the second decade of the 21th century. It is now part of a 
process which could determine the structure of the international system. 
Washington, Beijing, Moscow and Brussels are each pursuing their own objectives 
in a region where the role played by small and medium-sized powers cannot be 
underestimated. The four great powers of the contemporary world cannot be 
merely passive spectators. They are now actively at work to determine who gets 
what, where and when in the geopolitics of Central and South Asia. This article 
takes a close look at the protagonists‟ interests and strategies to gain the upper edge 
in a vital region of the globe.  
 
 
The Protagonists of the Great Game 
 
1. China  
The Chinese government‟s plan to build a high-speed rail network to connect the 
Far East with Central Asia and Europe is, among other reasons, a product of a clash 
between the great powers over Caspian and Caucasus energy resources. Dating 
back to the Prime Minister Li Peng (1987-98), the ambition to create a modern 
transport infrastructure in Eurasia took a large step forward in November 10, 2006, 
with the signing by representatives of eighteen countries of an agreement to 
implement the high-speed rail project. The network is expected to be completed by 
2025, with the consent and cooperation of the countries involved.  
 
The project is a contemporary reinterpretation of the ancient Silk Road and an 
attempt to unite West and East, albeit in an environment of fierce competition with 
the Siberian railway, the historic and imposing Russian railway network through 
Eurasia which serves as the gateway between Siberia and European Russia. This 
high-speed train service is not intended solely for passenger use. A fundamental 
reason for this project is the emergence of new industrial centers in Eurasia, which 
have generated the need to speed up trade in goods, lower onshore transport costs, 
and facilitate the import of hydrocarbons. 
 
Beijing‟s strategy, although simple, is carefully thought out. It wants to broaden its 
participation in, and cooperation with, countries on all continents, from Central and 
South America to South East Asia. To achieve this, it has decided to adopt the 
proven “African method,” which consists of providing, at low cost, a 
technologically advanced railway system to the prosperous governments of energy-
rich countries in the Central Asian region. In exchange it will gain access to raw 
materials, including oil and natural gas.
8
  
 
Hydrocarbons are indispensable in meeting the vast energy needs of the new 
economic Asian giant. However, China‟s strategy is perceived as a profound threat 
by Russian energy monolith Gazprom, which currently holds a monopoly in the 
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region and tries to withstand mounting attacks on its position, particularly the geo-
economic ones coming from China and the United States. These take the form of 
ongoing pipeline project proposals, devised as viable alternatives to the existing 
pipelines controlled by Russian.
9
   
 
 
Chinese Interests in Central Asia 
The Chinese political agenda in Central Asia addresses two important priorities:  
 
 ensuring the physical integrity of the People‟s Republic of China and 
securing the integrity of the region‟s national borders, thus promoting 
regional stability. 
 
 obtaining a significant share of the vast energy resources of the former 
Soviet republics of Central Asia by establishing profitable and lasting 
economic ties with them. 
 
Even during the Cold War Mao‟s China failed to carve out its own sphere of 
influence in Central Asia, which was subjected to a suffocating Soviet-style 
regency, and South Asia. However, this situation changed significantly in the early 
eighties, when the Chinese ruling class adopted a new approach in international 
relations: the so-called “Mulin Youhao,” or “good neighborly policy.” Since then, 
numerous efforts have been made by Beijing to engage in dialogue with its 
neighbors. Russia was the first courted country because of its geographic location 
and territorial size. Then, China turned its eyes towards Mongolia, India and the 
two Koreas, to finally intensify its diplomatic relations with Indonesia and 
Singapore. The implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 meant the demise of the 
bipolar balance which for decades had been the cornerstone of the international 
order. This tectonic event created a geopolitical earthquake in Central Asia, which 
left a sort of black hole which the Chinese communist leadership sought to reap 
immediate profit from.
10
   
 
Beijing set about reaching commercial, political and military agreements with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
11
 The volume 
of trade between the People‟s Republic and Central Asian states reached $465 
million in 1992 and 7.7 billion in 2004.
12
 In recent years, trade between China and 
Central Asian countries has increased significantly (see figure 1). In 2009 China 
for the first time exceeded Russia by volume of trade with the region. In 2010 trade 
turnover between Russia and Central Asian states reached $22 billion, between 
China and Central Asia $29 billion. The increasing volume of Chinese investments 
in the region and the growth of strategic goods export to China contribute to the 
rise of China as a major trade partner of Central Asia. The largest total trade among 
the five Central Asian countries is between China and Kazakhstan, amounting to 
around US$13.8 billion in 2009. Yet this total is still smaller than the trade volume 
between China and Vietnam at US$15.1 billion for the same year.
13
 In particular, 
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following the agreement reached in 1998 with Kazakhstan over a border dispute, 
Beijing provided incentives to create greater bilateral economic cooperation 
between the Kazakh state and Xinjiang, a Chinese autonomous region with Turkic 
population significantly more open to trading with Central Asian political entities. 
 
 
 Figure 1 – Trade between China and its Neighboring countries 
 
 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2008 and 2006 
 
The economic relationships Beijing has forged with regional players have been 
further facilitated by the complementarities between their economies. The adoption 
of the “African method” has enabled the Chinese ruling class to effectively play a 
poker game and achieve longstanding regional goals. Capturing access to the 
natural gas and oil fields was among its first priorities in Central Asia. The Chinese 
government has invested significant resources in building the infrastructure for the 
drilling, production and refining of Caspian and Caucasian hydrocarbons. This has 
been accompanied by the construction of an astute network of pipelines carrying 
hydrocarbons to China, bypassing Russia to the south, to satisfy the Chinese 
economy‟s ever-growing energy appetite.  
 
The diversification of routes for the export of energy resources and the promotion 
of regional economic cooperation are efficient ways for China to combat Russia‟s 
energy monopoly, which is the predominant economic lever in the Kremlin‟s 
arsenal of “hard power.” The TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) 
pipeline project, which is supported by China and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) and envisions the transport of Turkmen oil to Beijing through Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and India, is one potent example of how China is now trying to outdo its 
neighbors, especially Russia, in Central and South Asia.
14
 
 
In the last decade, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a state-owned 
enterprise, has signed various bilateral energy deals with Central Asian countries,
15
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which have also included the construction of roads and railways. Through these 
deals the Chinese authorities want to accelerate the transport of energy between 
China and its North Western neighbors. This in turn has opened the gate to a literal 
flood of agricultural and manufactured products from China to Central Asia. For 
China economic integration is not an end in itself but a prelude to deeper and more 
fruitful political and military integration. 
 
Security and regional stability are other major priorities for the Chinese dragon. 
Beijing seeks to ensure its national integrity and sovereignty by promoting greater 
cooperation in combating the spread of separatism, extremism and terrorism. In 
particular, it has a preoccupation with preventing separatist and extremist 
movements spreading in Xinjiang. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Central 
and South Asia is disturbing for Beijing, since it has the real potential to threaten 
the regional stability which the Chinese rulers deem crucial for achieving their 
policy objectives. These regional circumstances accounted for the establishment of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which, from China‟s perspective, 
can form a useful instrument to develop greater economic and military cooperation 
in the fight against Islamic radicalism and terrorism.
16
 
  
The SCO has the potential to help China extend its political and economic 
influence to Central Asian states, i.e., the countries which Russia, its main partner 
within this multilateral organization, is seeking to isolate by restoring an all-
encompassing control over these former Soviet republics. The fight against 
terrorism and the need to ensure regional stability are not seen in Beijing as 
necessary and expedient steps in securing regional supremacy. After the September 
11, 2011 attacks, the U.S.-led “global war on terror” saw Washington setting up 
permanent bases in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. These 
bold actions prompted the Chinese leadership to take a markedly anti-American 
posture within the SCO. It was clear to China that the US wanted to impose its 
political and economic influence in the region. In the future, China will seek to 
counter Washington‟s competing claims in the area out of expediency and to 
torpedo the historic concept of Central Asia as being reserved to an exclusive 
domain of Tsarist Russia, the former Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia. 
 
2. Russia 
The Central Asian region, rich in hydrocarbons, has always been on the political 
agenda of the Kremlin. Russia has sought to extend its imperial borders into 
Central and South Asia since the days of Tsarist autocracy. Stretching from Siberia 
to the Caucasus glaciers, the Russian Empire was well positioned to greatly benefit 
from the significant quantity of oil and natural gas found in the Caspian Sea, 
regarded for centuries as an internal Russian lake. However the massacres and 
widespread devastation of World War I taught Russia the clear lesson: multina-
tional empires do not last forever. Following the “Phoney War” the German, 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires collapsed, and the Tsarist Empire had 
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already been itself consigned to oblivion in February 1917. Consequently, Russia‟s 
solid grip on the Central Asian region was reduced, albeit temporarily. 
 
Despite the early promises of the Bolshevik revolution, and especially after the rise 
to power of Stalin‟s minions, the various ethnic groups and nationalities of the new 
Soviet political system were frustrated in their aspirations for independence and 
subjected to the control of a new empire, this time the Soviet Union. In the mid-
1930s Stalin took advantage of its huge supply of oil and natural gas to fuel the 
costly and massive Russian war machine in preparation for an expected military 
attack by Nazi Germany. Later, during the Cold War period, the Stalinist regime 
sought to excel in economic, technological and military terms as it became a 
genuine rival to the West, imposing a division of labor within the Soviet 
“federation” which reduced a number of Central Asian republics to the status of 
being mere suppliers of raw materials to other parts of the union.  
 
After Stalin‟s death the inherent weaknesses of dictator‟s empire (the flaws of the 
centrally-planned economy, the indiscriminate exploitation of the satellite states 
and the social costs of industrialization) were brought out into the open. This 
marked the beginning of the de-Stalinization process. Khrushchev, between 1956 
and 1964, and later Gorbachev in 1986-87, allowed a limited devolution of powers 
from Moscow to the various national governments which, perhaps inevitably, 
stoked the growth of independence movements and, in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, radical Islamic groups which fervently, and often with violence, demanded 
self-determination.
17
 The weakening of the Soviet Union soon reverberated 
throughout the entire Central Asian region. The independence of Ukraine, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, achieved between April and August 1991, weakened the 
Russian position on the Black Sea, hindering any attempt by Moscow to maintain 
or rebuild a Eurasian empire.  
 
Moreover, the former Soviet Central Asian republics, with the political and 
economic support of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, sought to free 
themselves from the vestiges of the Soviet regency.
18
 Consequently, Russia has 
been forced to share the vast energy resources of the Caspian basin with its former 
republics, which, relying on the financial support of Western powers (and China), 
have been able to export their gas and “black gold” through a complicated pipeline 
network by-passing Russian territory. Central Asian states‟ policies have given the 
U.S. extra leverage in its plans to further weaken Moscow‟s control over energy in 
the region through Gazprom.
19
  
 
Russian interests in Central Asia 
Russia‟s main interests in Central and South Asia are diverse. It fears the 
proliferation of regional independence movements tied to radical Islamic groups, 
which compromise its national security, a perception shared by China. Religious 
fundamentalism, in conjunction with the smuggling of weapons and drugs, 
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continues to be a real threat. Since the early 1990s Moscow has committed a 
significant number of troops to Tajikistan to prevent the destabilizing effect of 
radical movements in nearby Afghanistan on neighboring countries.
20
 
 
A second concern is energy, which is a strategic resource in character.
21
 Moscow is 
determined to retain a central role in the extraction and refining of oil, and 
particularly in the export of Caspian oil to Central Europe. Since huge quantities of 
the oil and gas exported by Russia to Eastern and Central Europe originate in the 
Caspian basin and Central Asia, it follows that a decrease in the European 
consumption of Russian energy would in the mid and long term drive a wedge 
between Moscow and the Central Asian republics and shatter their mutual 
friendship, to the ultimate benefit of the Euro-Atlantic countries.
22
 The Russian 
“South Stream” and “North Stream” pipeline projects should be interpreted as 
means of countering the NATO-Euro-Atlantic “energy offensive.”  
 
Furthermore, realizing that it is unable to tackle America‟s hegemonic ambitions in 
Central and South Asia alone, especially in the wake of shifts in the Bush doctrine 
and the adoption of the “global war on terror” in reaction to the attack on the Twin 
Towers in New York on 9/11, Moscow is keen to seek out “allies.” It is willing to 
turn to those countries which share its concerns over the United States‟ 
encroachment in Central and South Asia. This strategic context has been propitious 
for a Russia-China rapprochement, as exemplified by the establishment of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 and its founding goals.
23
 
Relations between Washington and Beijing have deteriorated since 2005. Many 
consider that China‟s censorship of Google, Washington‟s concern over “currency 
manipulation” and the agreement between Taipei and Washington to supply 
Taiwan with 60 Blackhawk helicopters, 114 Patriot missiles and a range of 
advanced communications systems are the main factors contributing to the rise of 
U.S.-China tensions. Xi Jinping, the Chinese Vice President, visited Moscow on 
March 24, 2010 and noted that "the good relations, the relations of strategic 
partnership characteristic of our [China and Russia] countries, have not changed.”24 
On that same day the two countries signed lucrative agreements to boost bilateral 
cooperation in the spheres of finance and industry.
25
 Relations between China and 
the U.S. cannot be overlooked by Russia or the Central Asian States as American 
consumers are the major buyers of Chinese manufactured goods and China the 
main creditor of the considerable U.S. government debt, holding vast quantities of 
treasury bills. 
 
In an attempt to placate its ever-greater number of energy consumers, Beijing has 
concluded bilateral agreements with several Central Asian countries which eat into 
the Russian energy monopoly. For instance, in July 2009 China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and the Kazakh oil company KazMunayGas completed the 
construction of the 962-kilometer Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline, which runs from 
Atyrau in Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China‟s Xinjiang and gives the Chinese 
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easier access to the vast energy supplies in the Caspian Sea. This project is 
perceived as somewhat of a “game changer” in the race to control the region‟s 
hydrocarbons. Similarly, in June 2006 CNPC signed an oil and gas exploration 
agreement with Uzbekneftegaz, which included five on-shore exploration blocks 
located in three large petroliferous Uzbek basins: Ustyurt, Amu Darya and 
Fergana. In 2008 the two state-owned companies signed a letter of intent to jointly 
boost the output of mature oilfields in the Fergana Basin.
26
  
 
These various agreements are part of a larger expression of the underlying rivalry 
between Russia and China. The two ex-Communist rivals will require foresight and 
coordination if they are to achieve a level of mutual cooperation in weakening the 
U.S. presence in Central Asia. 
 
3. The United States 
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004/05 ushered in the presidency of pro-
European Viktor Yushchenko, who had been backed by the White House against 
the openly pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. Within a few months 
the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan then ousted Askar Akayev who was also too 
Russian-orientated in the eyes of Washington.  
 
Kurmanbek Bakiev, the main Kyrgyz opposition leader, came to power and 
worked hard to consolidate the strings that could be pulled to make good his 
promise to dismantle the authoritarian system of the previous administration. 
However, he never really delivered. His administration proved to be one of tribes 
and bribes, a continuation of the clan rule which had characterized Akayev‟s 
regime. The levels of corruption and nepotism in the new government were even 
greater than in the previous one.  
 
Bakiev also was faced with a multitude of other problems: economic crisis, 
exacerbation of the conflict between the competing clans who divided and ruled the 
population and a transient and unstable central administration that lacked resolve 
and was engulfed in corruption scandal. It was little wonder that these 
circumstances prevented the country from being able to focus on a clear foreign 
policy direction. However, perhaps due to a desire to have the best of both worlds, 
throughout his tenure Bakiev allowed both Russia and the United States to keep 
their military bases in Kyrgyzstan, at Kant (Russian, established in 2003) and 
Manas (U.S., in 2001) respectively.  
 
On February 3, 2009, Bakiev announced that Manas Air Base would soon be 
closed, saying that economic considerations and the negative public attitude 
towards the base contributed to this decision. However, despite Russian pressure, 
he later reversed his decision and announced that the U.S. air base would be 
permitted to continue operating. 
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Kyrgyzstan‟s revolt in March 2010, during which Bakiev was finally ousted from 
power, allowed another opposition leader, Roza Otunbayeva, to form an interim 
government. This revolt, which almost escalated into a civil war, can now be 
interpreted in retrospect as the product of apparently purely internal issues. The 
populace was pushed to rise against the Kyrgyz government out of sheer 
exasperation. It can also be construed as the fulfillment of the Kremlin‟s plan, 
mostly elaborated by the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his clan, to 
counter and offset the ongoing wave of color revolutions (Georgia, Ukraine) which 
had only a few years before threatened Russian hegemony over Central Asia and 
the Caucasus as a whole. Moscow quickly recognized the Otunbayeva interim 
government, demonstrating its goodwill by extending a credit line of $150 million. 
 
The Kyrgyz upheaval held a high probability of reverberating, with significant 
political agitation, throughout Central Asia. This justified, at least to American 
policy-makers, the U.S. determination to maintain troops in Kyrgyzstan as part of 
the effort to achieve Washington‟s strategic objectives in Afghanistan and 
beyond.
27
 
 
U.S. Interests in Central Asia  
The United States‟ interest in Central Asia became more pronounced following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Washington‟s first priority was to remove the 
former republics from the orbit of communism and Moscow. In order to 
“decommunize” the region, the U.S. government tried to promote liberal economic 
and political reforms in the hope that it could transform these new states from 
socialist-type command economies into market-based economies. Thus in 1992 the 
Freedom Support Act was passed, leading to a total of $3.8 billion being allocated 
to support regional economic development from 1992 to 2005.
28
  
 
Removal from the Soviet orbit was to be achieved not only through the spread of 
Western liberal values but also through the dismantling of military arsenals and the 
closing of Russian military bases in Central Asia. This strategy was exhaustively 
outlined in the 1995 document A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement,
29
 which promoted the export of developmental models aimed at 
promoting democratic institutions and free trade on the international level and the 
demilitarization of the post-Soviet area. 
 
The U.S. strategic objectives in Central Asia also surfaced in the Silk Road 
Strategy Act of 1999. Great emphasis was placed on the need to develop closer and 
more profitable economic interaction between the region and the West. Such 
relations would promote trade and financial cooperation and vigorously counter the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, drug trafficking, terrorism and endemic 
corruption.  
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It was soon apparent though, as the Soviet regime became a historical relic, that 
Washington had an unambiguous interest in the region‟s energy resources. Since it 
had not yet found a valid replacement for Middle Eastern oil, the U.S. took the 
initiative to conclude agreements with energy supplier countries in Asia.
30
 Great 
efforts have been made to promote the construction of alternatives to the Russian 
energy corridors, including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
31
 pipeline from the 
2000s and now the Nabucco and TAPI pipelines.
32
  
 
The terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001 in New York, 
combined with a neo-conservative republican presidency, changed the priorities of 
presidential politics and the world scene. The “global war on terror” was seen by 
the American political class as an inevitable step to show what makes America tick 
and ensure that U.S. leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the post-bipolar 
world, remained intact. 
 
Suddenly, Fukuyama‟s “End of History" theory proved “unreasonably optimistic.” 
The Bush doctrine, as clearly expressed in the National Security Strategy of the 
United States of America
33
 pushed the need forward to forge a new U.S. foreign 
policy to deal with the perceived threat of Al Qaeda and to prevent the Afghan 
Taliban from remaining in power. Moreover, U.S. State Department supported a 
massive deployment of troops with a wide range of contractors in Kabul and, for 
that purpose, the ratification of bilateral agreements with such countries as 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.  
 
The White House was able to access the military base at Karshi-Khanabad in 
Uzbekistan (the United States Air Force used the base between 2001 and 
November 2005) and established U.S. facility at the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, 
while obtaining from Kazakhstan the right to fly over its territory to supply Manas 
and from Tajikistan an endorsement for the temporary use of the airport at 
Dushanbe. Important agreements for the exchange of information with regional 
states, other than Turkmenistan, were also concluded.
34
 Initially Washington could 
count on the support of the other regional players, notably China and Russia, when 
pursuing this strategy, as these countries were also concerned with curbing the 
spread of jihadist networks which threatened regional security and their own 
territorial integrity. 
 
Consequently, Washington, for a time, penetrated ever further into the region with 
its campaign of “democratization” within the authoritarian Central Asian reality. 
However, this policy has now produced a mild “blowback” for American policy-
makers. In spite of its good intentions, the “modernization” process, in many 
respects, annoyed Central Asian leaders more than anything else. It ultimately 
undermined their relations with the U.S., and in the end, convinced their political 
elites that respect for human rights, reform programs, the creation of a democratic 
civil society and openness to free international trade would cause the rapid 
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destabilization of their still-fragile regimes. They believed that only a strong, 
centralized authority could guarantee order.
35
  
 
This substantial divergence of views with the U.S. led the Central Asian states to 
perceive negatively Washington‟s hegemonic inclination and prompted them to 
develop and strengthen their relations with Russia and China.
36
 Washington also 
declined to bestow substantive economic aid on this part of the world and, in the 
aftermath of the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005, U.S. troops were evicted 
from the Uzbek military base.
37
  
 
Moscow and Beijing, now fully aware of the geopolitical shift occurring in the 
region and ready to put aside their disagreements, saw an opportunity to benefit 
from the situation and opted for conditional cooperation against the common foe 
under the umbrella of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (see figure 2).  
 
In July 2005, during an SCO session in Astana, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan jointly requested that the U.S. set a date for 
the withdrawal of its troops from their territory. The 2010 uprising in Kyrgyzstan 
and the direction of the new government of Roza Otunbayeva have called the 
continuing American presence at the Manas airbase into question. This stance has 
coincided with a further threat to U.S. geostrategic interests in Central Asia which 
now opens up new and complicated scenarios in the “New Great Game” of the XXI 
Century. 
 
Figure 2 - Chinese, Russian and American Economic Involvement in Central Asia   
 
Source: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2008 and 2006, Russia’s Federal State Statistics 
Services and U.S. Census Bureau 
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China and the United States have increased their role in Central Asia since the 1990s. 
Beijing was the driving force behind the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), which is considered by many to be an especially dynamic regional forum, with 
special relevance to Central Asia, not only in terms of trade, energy and security issues but 
as a political force that can be used to change the dynamics of the region. The increase of 
Chinese influence implies a progressive displacement of Russia, the traditional regional 
power, from its position of dominance. Russia‟s interests seem increasingly to be diverging 
from those of China in that part of the world, despite an apparent atmosphere of mutual 
understanding in their relations since the beginning of the 21st century. In this article, the 
actions and interests of China, Russia and the United States in the spheres of trade, energy 
and state security are reviewed and analyzed with regards to the Central Asian-Caspian 
region. 
 
 
